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Security Expert: Diebold Voting Machines Designed To Be Hacked
Bill Quigley
08 Oct 2008
In this interview with Velvet Revolution back in 2006,cybersecurity expert Stephen Spoonamore details his objections to electronic voting, and explains howDiebold voting machines such as those used in Ohio and a number of other states, can be hacked.
 
The text of his deposition can be found below the videos.
 
 Stephen Spoonamore interview part 1
In this segment, Spoonamore details his own qualifications, and his interest in electronic voting systems.
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 Stephen Spoonamore interview part 2
Among other things, Spoonamore explains the several ways that a Diebold voting machine can be hacked from a remote location.
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 Stephen Spoonamore interview part 3
In this segment, Spoonamore continues explaining how the chain of custody of  voting results can be easily hacked, and how electronic voting systems are capable of subtracting as well as adding votes.
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 Stephen Spoonamore interview part 4
Spoonamore reviews the "Georgia patch" which was used to flip the 2002 US Senate election in Georgia. 
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Stephen Spoonamore interview part 5
In this segment, Spoonamore emphasizes the importance of clean elections in a democracy.
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Stephen Spoonamore interview part 6
"There is no electronic system in the world that cannot be hacked... Diebold is lying."
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Stephen Spoonamore interview part 7
"Diebold machines are brilliantly designed to steal elections..."
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Stephen Spoonamore interview part 8
"People do not want to believe that Americans would  steal elections..."
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 The text of this deposition is reprinted from the good people at Op-Ed News
 
Declaration of Stephen Spoonamore
[address redacted] 

1. I am a recognized expert in the field of electronic data security and digital network architecture.  

2.
I have agreed to serve as an expert witness for the plaintiffs in the
case of King Lincoln Bronzeville Neighborhood Association before the
United States District Court in Columbus, Ohio.  

3.
I have served as the CEO and/or CTO of companies engaged in the design
and development of digital systems. Including: CPR Group Inc., Cybrinth
LLC, DuosTech Inc., SWN Communications, FreePlay Inc. and GSP inc.  

4.
I have served in industry leadership positions in a number of
professional organizations in the field of electronic data security and
commerce, including but not limited to: Board Member of the AFEI
(Association For Enterprise Integration) and Task Force Chairman, NECCC
(National Electronic Commerce Coordination Commission) to establish
digital identity rules for State Government Systems.  

5.
Digital Systems I have designed or consulted upon are currently serving
to secure elements of: MasterCard, American Express, Chubb insurance,
Bloomberg, Boeing, NBC-GE, NewsCorp, the US Department of Energy, The
US Navy, The US Department of State and Other Government Agencies.  

6.
Because of my interest in data security and in democracy, I have
followed with interest the security issues involved with electronic
voting in United States. My understanding of the vulnerabilities of
American elections to fraudulent manipulation is based upon
conversations with professionals in election administration working
within state governmental structures as well as information technology
specialists working in private industry on a contract basis for state
governments.  

7.
I have agreed to function as an expert resource and witness for
plaintiffs' counsel and the King Lincoln case in federal court in Ohio.
 

8.
The opinions expressed below are held by me to a reasonable degree of
certainty as understood within my professional area of expertise in the
detection and prevention of fraud in data processing systems.  

In regard to the system set up to tabulate the vote in Ohio in 2004.  

1) The vote tabulation and reporting system, as initially designed, was supposed to allow each  county
central tabulator (Computer A) to add up local information locally, and
then, via a lightly encrypted system, send the information to the Sec.
of State statewide tabulator (Computer B). This system, while using
public Internet and public information carrying capacity, could be
compromised at the level of one county (Computer A is hacked) or in the
transmission of any one county to the central state tabulator (Computer
A talking to Computer B). However, it would only be possible to
compromise the vote on a statewide basis by a compromise at the state
level tabulator (Computer B is hacked). Alternately I have been told
that these processes were replaced at the last minute by fax
transmitted results.
 

It
is relatively simple to establish if the security of the transmissions,
whether sent by fax, or by electronic transmission, by reviewing the
network architecture as operated on election night, and review the
session logs of the secretary of states central tabulation computer to
determine the IP address and times of communication by other machines
to the the Secretary. The variable nature of the story of what
occurred, and lack of documentation available, would be cause to launch
an immediate fraud investigation in any of my banking clients.  

2)
The vote tabulation and reporting system, as modified at the direction
of Mr. Blackwell, allowed the introduction of a single computer in the
middle of the pathway. This computer located at a company principally
managing IT Systems for GOP campaign and political operations (Computer
C) received all information from each county computer (Computer A)
BEFORE it was sent onward to Computer B. This centralized collection of
all incoming statewide tabulations would make it extremely easy for a
single operator, or a preprogrammed single "force balancing computer"
to change the results in any way desired by the team controlling
Computer C. In this case GOP partisan operatives. Again, if this out of
state system had ANY digital access to the Secretary of States system
it would be cause for immediate investigation by any of my banking
clients.  

3)
If scenario #2 described above is true, Computer C, was placed
functionally in a central control position in the network, for Computer
C to have even updated instructions for various tabulators at the
county level (Computers A) to change their results at the county level.
If this had happened, in order to cover up this fact, the hard drives
of the county level tabulators would have to be pulled and destroyed,
as they would have digital evidence of this hacking from Computer C.
The efforts by the company in charge of these computers to pull out
hard drives and destroy them in advance of the Green Party Recount from
the 2004 election is a clear signal something was deliberately amiss
with the county tabulators (Computers A).  

If
even the presence of such a Computer C was found in a banking system,
it would be cause to launch an immediate fraud investigation. This
computer placement, in the middle of the network, is a defined type of
attack. It is called a MIM (Man in the Middle) Attack. It is a common
problem in the banking settlement space. A criminal gang will introduce
a computer into the outgoing electronic systems of a major retail mall,
or smaller branch office of a bank. They will capture the legitimate
transactions and then add fraudulent charges to the system for their
benefit.  

Another
common MIM is the increasingly common "false" website attack. In this
MIM, errors in the computers that feed the Digital Name Service are
exploited directing an unsuspecting user to a site that looks like the
one they wished to visit, but is in fact an "evil twin" which then
exploits them for various purposes for a portion of the time, and then
in many cases passes them on the CORRECT web site they wanted. Once
passed on, the operators of the evil twin site may continue to exploit
the user, or later duplicate the session and exploit them in another
manner. Any time all information is directed to a single computer for
consolidation, it is possible, and in fact likely, that single computer
will exploit the information for some purpose.  

In
the case of Ohio 2004, the only purpose I can conceive for sending all
county vote tabulations to a GOP managed Man-in-the-Middle site in
Chattanooga BEFORE sending the results onward to the Sec. of State,
would be to hack the vote at the MIM.  

IN REGARD TO THE DIEBOLD SYSTEMS, Formerly Global, DESI and now called Premier.  

In
my opinion, there is NO POSSIBLE WAY to make a secure touch screen
voting system. None. Secure systems are predicated on establishing
securely the identity of every user of the system. Voting is predicated
on being anonymous. It is impossible to have a system that does both.  

It
is possible to design relatively secure optical scan machines, but even
these can be hacked in even the best of cases. In the case of optical
scan you have the ability to recount manually the paper ballot itself,
and the ability to spot check the machines for errors against a sample
of hand recounting.  

Even
considering no secure system for touch screen machines can be designed,
ever, the Diebold system is riddled with exploitable errors. The SAIC
report on the system architecture, commissioned by Maryland Gov.
Erlich, outlined over 200 concerns. Many of these concerns are almost
comical from the perspective of a computer architect. One example of
this:  

The
existence of negative fields being possible in some number fields.
Voting machines as custom built computers which should be designed to
begin at the number Zero, no votes, and advance only in increments of
1, one vote, until they max out at the most possible votes cast in one
day. Perhaps 3000 voters could use a machine in one day, but more
realistically 400 or so. There is no possible legitimate reason that
NEGATIVE votes should ever be entered.  And yet these machines are capable of having negative numbers programmed in, injected, or preloaded.  

IN REGARD to Mr. Mike Connell.  

Mr.
Connell and I share a mutual interest in democracy building, freedom of
speech and religion worldwide. We have mutually participated in
activity to forward this goal. At a meeting in London last year, and
again at a Lunch in Washington, DC, Mike and I briefly discussed voting
security. While he has not admitted to wrongdoing, and in my opinion he
is not involved in voting theft, Mike clearly agrees that the
electronic voting systems in the US are not secure. He further made a
statement that he is afraid that some of the more ruthless partisans of
the GOP, may have exploited systems he in part worked on for this
purpose.  

Mr.
Connell builds front end applications, user interfaces and web sites.
Knowing his team and their skills, I find it unlikely they would be the
vote thieves directly. I believe however he knows who is doing that
work, and has likely turned a blind eye to this activity. Mr. Connell
is a devout Catholic. He has admitted to me that in his zeal to 'save
the unborn' he may have helped others who have compromised elections.
He was clearly uncomfortable when I asked directly about Ohio 2004.  

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

 

Executed this 17th day of September 2008.

Stephen Spoonamore

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